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1 Introduction
Government procurement contracts are a signicant part of many economies, often amount-
ing to 15-20 percent of GDP (WTO, 2013). When seeking a provider for a government
contract, it has been a long-standing tradition that the nature of the bidding favors domes-
tic rms over foreign ones. For the most part, this has taken place via a system in which
the contract is awarded to a foreign rm only if that rm's bid is suciently lower than the
lowest bid tendered by a domestic rm, known as a price preference. For example, under the
European Community regulations, the contract was awarded to a member rm so long as its
bid was no more than three percent higher than the lowest non-member bid (Branco, 1994).
This preferential procurement policy has been attributed to a government which values do-
mestic rm prots more than foreign rms (McAfee and McMillan, 1989).1 This notion was
expanded upon by Branco (1994), who considers the optimal mechanism to implement this
preference, and Miyagiwa (1991), who includes both public and private consumption. In
1996, this practice began to be dismantled by the Government Procurement Agreement, an
international agreement in which signatories agree to non-discrimination, that is, a selection
process by which foreign rms are treated no dierently than their domestic competitors.2
This, however, ensures equal treatment under the bidding process but does not eliminate
other mechanisms by which foreign rms are treated dierently than domestic rms, most
notably trade policy. Recently, concerns have been expressed that due to increasing de-
mands for protectionism, governments will resort to such methods to put foreigners at a
disadvantage in procurement bidding. For example, within the European Union, there has
been mounting pressure to restrict bidding to foreign rms that would use a suciently high
level of domestic content when fullling a government contract (Economist, 2012). Although
there is a literature examining procurement processes with a price preference oered to do-
mestic rms, as yet, there is no analysis of competition under protection. That is the gap
1They also demonstrate that, by shifting bidding behavior, this can increase domestic welfare when foreign
rms have cost advantages.
2See WTO (2013) for a detailed description of this agreement.
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this paper lls.
We do so by considering an auction for a government contract in which two rms, one
domestic and one foreign, tender bids to the domestic government. In contrast to the prefer-
ential procurement processes studied elsewhere, the contract is awarded to the rm with the
lowest bid. A second dierence is that we allow the domestic government to impose a tari,
either specic or ad valorem, on the foreign rm. These taris can also be thought of as the
added cost to the foreign rm of meeting domestic content restrictions that would make it
eligible to bid. We show that the imposition of a tari does indeed imped the probability of
the foreign rm winning the contract. Furthermore, it increases the range of bids that are
submitted by the domestic rm.
When domestic prots are positively valued, the government will impose a positive tari
in equilibrium. Further, this optimal tari (from the home government's perspective) is
increasing in the value placed on domestic prots. When domestic prots and government
surplus are equally valued, this results in a tari which is, in expectation, more protectionist
than the optimal price preference (as derived by Branco (1994)). This holds for both the
specic and ad valorem taris. Comparing the two optimal taris, the specic tari is
particularly protectionist for low cost foreign rms whereas the ad valorem tari tends to
be especially protectionist for moderate cost foreigners, with both driving high cost foreign
rms out of the market entirely. This is due to the fact that, whereas the absolute cost of
the ad valorem tari is increasing in the foreign rm's cost, the specic one is not. Since the
optimal specic tari is geared towards the \average" foreign rm, this then creates a greater
burden for low cost foreign rms. Further, both tari schemes lower welfare, measured as
that in the domestic economy or the world as a whole, in comparison to the price preference
welfare with the optimal ad valorem tari being marginally welfare superior to the optimal
specic tari. This then is in line with the concern that the Government Procurement
Agreement may be driving governments towards other, less ecient protectionist methods.
In contrast, we show that when the weight the government places on domestic prots is low,
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the equilibrium under either tari regime is one of free trade and social welfare is maximized.
This then highlights the importance of favoritism in the equilibrium policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and solve for the
bidding strategies of rms. Section 3 describes the government's optimal tari. Section
4 compares the equilibrium tari with the equilibrium price preference scheme using the
parameters in Branco (1994). Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model has three players, a domestic government, a domestic rm, and a foreign rm. The
government has a project, to which it attaches a value V , that it wishes to have completed.3
To that end, it runs a rst-price, sealed-bid auction in which the two rms simultaneously
tender bids (bd for the domestic rm and bf for the foreign rm) which are the rm's price
for which it will carry out the contract. The bidding results in the contract being awarded to
the rm with the lowest bid. Note that this is in contrast to a policy with a price preference,
in which the domestic rm can win the contract even if bd > bf so long as this dierence is
less than some predetermined level. In the event of equal bids, the contract is awarded to
the domestic rm. The timing of the model is as follows. In the rst stage, the government
sets a tari which the foreign rm must pay if it wins the contract. We solve for two separate
scenarios: When the government uses a specic tari   0 and when it uses an ad valorem
tari t  0. This can be thought of as a tari in which the foreign rm must pay on inputs
brought in from its own country. Alternatively, instead of a tari, this could represent the
additional cost to the foreign rm of negotiating domestic content regulations (as might occur
if it is forced to use a domestic supplier rather than its preferred supplier located in another
country).4 The key distinction between these taris is that the specic tari payment is the
3We assume that this is suciently large so that, in equilibrium, the government's value exceeds the
winning equilibrium bid. We formalize this condition below.
4Further, if there are registration fees that the domestic rm, by virtue of its existence has already paid
but the foreign rm has not, then the \tari" could represent those additional fees the foreign rm must pay
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same for any successful foreigner (i.e. it is a at fee) where as the ad valorem tari payment
will vary across foreigners with dierent costs. In the second stage, the rms simultaneously
submit bids. In the nal stage, bids are opened, the contract is awarded, production takes
place, and payos accrue. We solve the game via backwards induction. We begin by solving
the general problem without any assumption on the type of tari used, then analyze the
solution under each tari separately.
2.1 Firms
Prior to the commencement of the game, each rm i = d; f obtains a cost ci which is
independently drawn from a uniform distribution with the support [cd; cd] for the domestic
rm and [cf ; cf ] for the foreign rm. The bounds of the foreign cost distribution are functions
of taris, as discussed momentarily. We assume that the two cost distributions dier only
due to taris, i.e. that under free trade the cost distributions are identical. This assumption
greatly simplies the analysis, however we expect that the results generalize somewhat to
asymmetric distributions even with a zero tari.5 Note that there are limits to the potential
asymmetry. In particular, if cd  2cf cf , the Nash equilibrium must have the domestic rm
always winning by bidding cf , i.e. the foreign rm is unable to compete.
6 As a consequence,
we only consider cases wherein cd > 2cf   cf since for taris where this fails, the domestic
rm always wins.7 While the distribution of costs are public knowledge, each rm's cost
realization is private information. Dene bi(ci) as the bid function and ci(b) as the inverse
bid function for rm i. As shown by Griesmer, et al. (1967) any non-trivial equilibrium
(i.e. one in which both rms have a positive probability of winning) must be characterized
by monotonic and dierentiable bid functions and we therefore restrict our attention to this
after winning but before it can fulll the contract. Under this latter interpretation, the tari would not be
discriminatory against the foreign rm in the strictest sense.
5This then shuts down the cost-driven motives for the price preference considered in McAfee and McMillan
(1989).
6This is discussed in detail for rst-price auctions by Kaplan and Zamir (2012) and Kaplan and Wettstein
(2000).
7Note that, as we demonstrate below, since the optimal tari is non-prohibitive this restriction has no
consequences for our equilibrium analysis.
5
class of bid functions.
In the following analysis, we build on the results of Kaplan and Zamir (2012) who derive
analytic solutions to an auction with uniform, but asymmetric, valuation distributions. We
modify their analysis in order to t it to the setting we consider. Before proceeding certain
aspects of bidding behavior should be made clear. First, to rule out multiple equilibria, we
assume that a rm with a zero probability of winning bids its cost. Second, in equilibrium,
no bid greater than cf will be tendered. The reason for this is that, should one rm do so, the
other would be able to marginally undercut that bid and discretely increase its probability of
winning while only marginally lowering its payo. Thus, bids will be bounded from above.
We begin by considering the domestic rm. In the second stage of the game, rms take
the tari as given. The domestic rm's expected prot from tendering a bid of bd is
E[d] = (bd   cd) Pr(domestic rm winsj cd)
where the probability of it winning is the probability that it tenders the lower bid, i.e. that
the foreign rm's cost leads it to tender a higher bid:
 
1 HC [cf (bd)]

= 1  cf (bd)  cf
cf   cf
=
cf   cf (bd)
cf   cf
:
This results in expected domestic rm prots of:
E[d] = (bd   cd)

cf   cf (bd)
cf   cf

: (1)
Maximizing expected prot, for an interior solution, the optimal inverse bidding strategy for
rm d solves the rst order condition:

cf   cf (bd)
cf   cf

  (bd   cd(bd))
c0f (bd)
cf   cf
= 0:
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Dening the minimum and maximum bids which are tendered in equilibrium as b and b
respectively, for any bd 2 [b; b], we must have
[b  cd(b)]c0f (b) + cf (b) = cf : (2)
Similarly for the foreign rm, the probability that bf is the winning bid is
 
1 HC [cd(bf )]

= 1  cd(bf )  cd
cd   cd
=
cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd
:
Therefore, it has the following expected prot
E[f ] = (bf   cf )

cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd

: (3)
Maximizing expected prot, the optimal inverse bidding strategy for the foreign rm solves
the following rst order condition:

cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd

  (bf   cf (bf )) c
0
d(bf )
cd   cd
= 0:
Therefore, in equilibrium, because this must hold for any bf 2 [b; b], we must have
[b  cf (b)]c0d(b) + cd(b) = cd: (4)
Thus, we have a system of two dierential equations that dene the equilibrium:
[b  cd(b)]c0f (b) + cf (b) = cf ; (5)
[b  cf (b)]c0d(b) + cd(b) = cd: (6)
From this, three results follow. First, a foreign rm with a cost cf will submit a bid equal to
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this cost, i.e. cf (cf ) = cf which implies that b  cf .8 Second, as the bidding functions are
monotone, the lowest bid tendered by a domestic rm must be tendered by a rm with cost
cd. The analogous result must hold for the foreign rm. Third, these minimum bids must
be the same for each rm (and are therefore equal to b). If this is not the case, for example
if the domestic minimum bid is lower than the minimum foreign bid, then the domestic rm
tendering such a bid can raise its bid and increase prots without decreasing its probability of
winning, implying that such a bid could not have been an equilibrium bid. Thus, cd(b) = cd
and cf (b) = cf .
Adding equations (5) and (6) together and rearranging yields:
cd(b)c
0
f (b) + cf (b)c
0
d(b) = cf (b) + cd(b) + c
0
f (b)b+ c
0
d(b)b  (cf + cd) (7)
or, recognizing that the right-hand side is the derivative of
 
cf (b) + cd(b)  (cf + cd)

b with
respect to b:
cd(b)c
0
f (b) + cf (b)c
0
d(b) =
h 
cf (b) + cd(b)  (cf + cd)

b
i0
(8)
By integrating with respect to b, we obtain:
cd(b)  cf (b) = [cd(b) + cf (b)]  b  [cf + cd]  b+ & (9)
where & is the constant of integration. In order to determine &, we require the maximum bid
which is solved in our rst lemma.
Lemma 1. The upper bound of the bid functions, b, is given by
b =
cd + cf
2
:
Proof. If the foreign rm has a cost greater than or equal to cf (b), it has no chance of
winning and therefore bids its cost. Note that this implies that cf (b) = b. This makes the
8Recall that rms with no chance of winning bid their costs.
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probability of the domestic rm winning with a bid b equal to
h
cf b
cd cd
i
. By denition of the
inverse bid function, the domestic rm with cost cd(b) does not benet from bidding more
than b, meaning that expected prots must be such that:
(b  cd(b))

cf   b
cd   cd

 (b  cd(b))

cf   b
cd   cd

; 8 b  b:
This can be rewritten as:
 

b 

cd(b) + cf
2
2
  

b 

cd(b) + cf
2
2
(10)
Since this has to hold for all b  b, this requires that b  cd(b)+cf
2
. Similarly, by denition of
the maximum bid, the domestic rm with cost cd(b) cannot benet from bidding below b:
(b  cd(b))

cf   b
cd   cd

 (b  cd(b))

cf   cf (b)
cd   cd

; 8 b  b:
However since cf (b)  b, we have
(b  cd(b))

cf   b
  (b  cd(b)) [cf   b] ; 8 b  b:
This can happen only if b  cd(b)+cf
2
. Combining these then implies that:
b =
cd + cf
2
: (11)
Note that this is the upper bound of the bid function, not the maximum bid tendered
by a foreign rm. Because b is the average of the two upper limits of the cost distributions,
for a positive tari it is strictly less than the highest foreign rm cost. This implies that for
a positive tari, a high-cost foreign rm will bid its cost which exceeds this level. Recalling
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that for both rms to be able to compete that cd > 2cf   cf , this maximum bid pins down
the minimum value the government places on the project, implying that V  cd+~cf
2
where ~cf
is the highest foreign cost inclusive of a tari. Intuitively, this valuation implies that for any
tari in which both rms compete, the government will choose to accept the winning bid in
equilibrium.
Returning to (9), we can use the maximum bid to solve for the constant of integration.
Recalling that cf (b) = b, evaluating (9) at b reduces to:
& =

cd + cf
2
2
: (12)
This allows us to rewrite (9) as:
cd(b)  cf (b) = [cd(b) + cf (b)]  b  [cf + cd]  b+

cd + cf
2
2
(13)
With this in hand, we can nd the lower bound of the bid function, b.
Lemma 2. The lower bound of the bid function, b is given by
b =

cd+cf
2
2
  cd  cf
(cd   cd) + (cf   cf )
: (14)
Proof. Recall that the lowest cost rms both submit bids of b, i.e. cd(b) = cd and cf (b) = cf .
Using this and evaluating (13) at b, the above result is found.
2.1.1 Equilibrium Bid Functions
In order to solve for our bid functions, we need to reduce our two dierential equations to
one. Using (13), we can solve for cf (b) in terms of cd(b)
cf (b) =
cd(b)b  [cf + cd]b+

cd+cf
2
2
cd(b)  b (15)
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Plugging this into (6) yields:
 

cd + cf
2

  b
2
c0d(b) = [cd   cd(b)] [cd(b)  b] : (16)
Rearranging this, we are left with the single dierential equation

(cd + cf )  2b
2
c0d(b) = 4

cd(b)  cd

cd(b)  b

: (17)
Note that this solution not only satises the rst order conditions but, as proven by Griesmer,
et al. (1967), the second order conditions as well. We can now solve for the analytic solutions
of the equilibrium bid functions.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium inverse bid functions are given by
cd(b) = cd   (cf   cd)
2
4(b  cf ) + (2b  (cd + cf ))1 exp

cf cd
cd+cf 2b
 (18)
cf (b) = cf   (cf   cd)
2
4(b  cd) + (2b  (cd + cf ))2 exp

cd cf
cd+cf 2b
 (19)
where
1 =  
24exp

cd cf
2(b b)

2(b  b)
35(cf   cd)2
cd   cd
+ 4(cf   b)

< 0 (20)
2 =  
24exp

cf cd
2(b b)

2(b  b)
35(cf   cd)2
cf   cf
+ 4(cd   b)

< 0: (21)
Proof. First dene   (cd + cf )  2cd = cf   cd, x  b  cd, and D(x) such that
cd(b) =
2
D(x)
+ cd (22)
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We then have c0d(x) =   
2
D(x)2
D0(x), and equation (17) becomes
  
2
D(x)2
D0(x)(  2x)2 = 4

2
D(x)
+ cd   cd
 
2
D(x)
+ cd   b

;
  
2
D(x)2
D0(x)(  2x)2 = 4

2
D(x)
 
2
D(x)
  x

;
D0(x)(  2x)2 = 4 xD(x)  2 ;
D0(x)(  2x)2 = 4xD(x)  16x(  x)  4(  2x)2;
(D0(x) + 4)(  2x)2 = 4x[D(x)  4(  x)];
Furthermore
D0(x) + 4
D(x)  4(  x) =
4x
(  2x)2
=
2
(  2x)2  
2
  2x
By integrating both sides, we obtain
ln
 
D(x)  4(  x) = 
  2x + ln(  2x) + ln1;
and taking the exponent of both sides yields
D(x) = (  2x)1e  2x + 4(  x) (23)
where 1 is a constant of integration. The lower boundary condition cd(b) = cd determines
1. When b = b, we have x = x  b  cd. From the denition, it follows that D(x) = 2cd cd .
Hence the boundary condition becomes
1 =
"
e 

 2x
  2x
# 
2
cd   cd
  4(  x)

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which can be rewritten as (recall the denition of  and that b =
cd+cf
2
)
1 =  
24exp

cd cf
2(b b)

2(b  b)
35(cf   cd)2
cd   cd
+ 4(cf   b)

< 0: (24)
The analogous sequence of steps results in the foreign inverse bid function and 2.
Up to this point, we have not discussed precisely how the foreign cost depends on the
tari. With these results in hand, we now do so by considering the specic and ad valorem
taris in turn.
2.1.2 Specic Tari
Given the assumption that the cost distributions dier only in taris, with a specic tari the
foreign cost distribution is simply the domestic one shifted upwards by  . In order to simplify
the analysis, without loss of generality, we restrict the domestic rm's cost distribution to
the unit interval.9 Therefore, in this section we analyze the case in which the government
charges a specic tari which results in a foreign cost cf 2 [; 1 +  ]. Note that this implies
that the tari is such that 0   < 2 and, by plugging in the minimum and maximum bids,
that  (4 
2)
4
 1  2b  2    0 with strict equality at the minimum and maximum bids.
Thus, the inverse bid functions can be simplied to:
cd(b) = 1  
2
4(b  1  ) + 11 exp

 
1
 (25)
cf (b) = 1 +    
2
4(b  1) + 12 exp


1
 (26)
9With a specic tari, the only implication of this range is for the minimum value of V . As will be dis-
cussed below, this assumption does, however, have additional implications in the ad valorem case. However,
in order to compare our results to Branco (!994) who makes this assumption, we will continue to use it there
as well.
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where
b =
2 + 
2
; b =
(2 + )2
8
;
1 =  
"
2
 
2 + 

2  
#
exp
  4
4   2

; and 2 =
4
1
:
Further, notice that in both of these bid functions, the fraction terms are non-negative (since
costs are bounded from above by the maximum costs for each type of rm). In addition, by
using the maximum bid, it must be that 1  0; with equality only at the maximum bid. In
addition, as  ! 0, we have the symmetric case. Using L'Ho^pital's Rule, we have
lim
!0
cd(b) = 2b  cd (27)
lim
!0
cf (b) = 2b  cd: (28)
These will be useful for evaluating welfare under free trade. Also, note that in this case, the
maximum bid is cd = 1.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the bid functions corresponding to these these inverse bid
functions. We plot these as a function of rm costs where the foreign cost is exclusive of
 > 0. For comparison and space issues, we also plot the bid functions corresponding the
case in which the government charges an ad valorem tari; the scenario we explore in more
detail in the next section. This demonstrates some of the features of the bidding functions
discussed above. First, the lowest cost domestic and foreign rms both submit the minimum
bid. Second, the highest cost domestic rm submits the maximum bid. Third, for foreign
rms with costs in excess of b, they bid their cost and have a zero probability of winning.
This is why the foreign bid function does not extend beyond b. We analyze the characteristics
of these bid functions in further in the following proposition and lemmas.
Proposition 2. The domestic rm's bid is increasing in the specic tari.
Proof. Begin by considering a domestic rm with a cost cd(b) < cd. Taking the derivative of
14
Figure 1: Bid Functions  = t = 0:4
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(25) with respect to the tari yields:
dcd(b)
d
= (cd(b)  1)
242

+
4 + 11 exp

 
1
 h
   
21
i
4(b  1  ) + 11 exp

 
1

35 (29)
where
 

8 2
(4   2)2

=

1
[1(b)]2

 2
2
:
This makes the second term positive and, since cd(b) < cd = 1, the inverse cost function is
weakly decreasing in the tari. This means that as the tari rises, the domestic rm cost
associated with a given bid declines. Put dierently, as the bid function is monotone in
costs, the bid associated with a given cost increases. Further, because a domestic rm with
the maximum cost cd bids the maximum bid, b =
2+
2
, such a rm's bid also rises.
Thus, as the foreign rm is disadvantaged due to the tari, the bid submitted by the
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domestic rm increases. Turning to the foreign rm's inverse bid function, we are able to
identify two properties of the relationship between it and the tari. The rst shows that,
like the domestic rm, the foreign inverse bid function is non-increasing in the tari when
beginning from free trade.
Lemma 3. When domestic costs are distributed uniform on the unit interval, at a zero tari,
the foreign inverse bid function is non-increasing in the specic tari.
Proof. For when cd = 1 and cd = 0,
lim
!0
dcf (b)
d
=  

1
3
+
8(b  1)3
3

Recall that with a zero tari, the foreign inverse bid function is cf (b) = 2b   cd, thus bids
will be between .5 and 1. Therefore this expression will range from 0 for the lowest cost
foreign rm to  1
3
for the highest cost foreign rm.
Beginning from free trade and introducing a tari, for a given bid this means that the
associated cost inclusive of the tari falls. Alternatively, a rm with a given cost increases
its bid. It is important to note, however, that it increases its bid by no more than one. This
implies that, although it increases its bid in an eort to cover the rise in costs, only the
highest cost foreign rm fully passes through the cost of the tari. For rms with less than
this cost, they choose to absorb part of the tari increase in order to better their chances
of winning the contract. This introduces a tension for the foreign rm between its desire to
still win the contract (leading it to absorb the tari) and its desire to maximize the prot
of winning (leading it to pass through the tari). Unlike the domestic rm where there is
no such tradeo, this tension prevents us from signing the change in the foreign inverse bid
function with respect to a positive tari for the full range of inverse costs. Nevertheless, we
can show the following result.
Lemma 4. The foreign rm's inverse bid function is decreasing in the specic tari for bids
b 2 b; b^. Further, for bids outside this range, dcf (b)
d
< 1.
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Proof. Focusing on the lower bound of the bid and cost space for the foreign rm, as the
tari rises there are two things that change in response to a tari, b and cf (which, recall, is
inclusive of the tari). Specically,
db
d
=
2 + 
4
and
dcf
d
= 1:
Recalling that the minimum bid is submitted by the lowest cost rm, these combine so that
the inverse bid function moves such that:
dcf (b)
d
= 
2+
which is between 0 and 1 for any
positive tari. Further, since   2, it follows that
db
d
 dcf
d
:
By continuity and the fact that cf (b) is monotonically increasing in b, then for bids close to
b, the same holds.
However, even if the foreign inverse bid function increases in the tari, meaning that a
rm with a given cost lowers its bid as the tari increases, it will not absorb the full amount
of the tari increase. To see this, suppose that it instead lowers its bid by the same amount
as the increase in the tari. In this case, its bid would stay the same, meaning so too would
its probability of winning. If that were true, the domestic rm would not change its bid
either, implying no change in foreign's probability of winning. Recalling that the optimal
bid balances the gain from a higher winning bid (the probability of winning) against the loss
from a lower chance of winning (the bid less the cost times the change in the probability of
winning) absorbing the full cost of the tari would not aect the rst but would lower the
second. As such, that would not be prot maximizing for the foreign rm. Combining this
fact with the monotonicity of the inverse bid function therefore implies that
dcf (b)
d
< 1 even
if it is not negative.
17
Thus for at least some range of costs, the foreign rm increases its bid as the tari rises
even when the tari is positive. This is because for rms with low costs, the probability of
winning is suciently large that they are willing to trade o a lower chance of winning with
a higher payo if it does win. One implication of this is that it implies an increase in the
expected prots of the domestic rm.
Lemma 5. Expected domestic prots are increasing in the specic tari for all values of cd.
Proof. Inserting the domestic bid function into its rst order condition, taking the derivative
with respect to  , using the envelope theorem, and using the result that
dcf (b)
d
< 1: dE[d]
d
=
(bd (cd)  cd)

1  dcf (bd(cd))
d
cd cd

> 0 i.e. given its cost, the domestic rm's expected prots rise
following the tari increase.
2.1.3 Ad Valorem Tari
In this section, we consider an ad valorem tari instead of a specic tari. Given that
Proposition 1 did not rely on the mapping between taris and foreign costs, it is not surprising
that the nature of the results are quite similar. Therefore in this section, we focus on the
dierence in bidding behavior between the ad valorem and specic taris. This primarily
is about what happens when t ! 1 under our assumption that the lowest domestic cost is
zero.
To maintain tractability, we assume the tari is placed on the bid which we will dene
as t. Note that, since the bid represents the value of the foreign rm's activity, i.e. the value
of its imports, this is not unreasonable. This changes the expected prot of the foreign rm
to be equal to
E[f ] = [(1  t)bf   cf ]

cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd

: (30)
This can be rewritten as
E[f ] = (1  t)

bf   cf
(1  t)
 
cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd

= (1  t) [bf   Cf ]

cd   cd(bf )
cd   cd

(31)
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where Cf =
cf
(1 t) . This transformation allows us to utilize the methods previously used in
the specic tari case, where the foreign cost is now Cf  U

0; 1
1 t

. Since multiplying
the expected prot of this transformed prot function by (1   t) is simply a monotonic
transformation, the general bidding strategies are the same as equations (18) and (19).
Using the transformed bounds on the foreign cost distribution, we have
cd(b) = 1 
 
t
1 t
2
4

b  1
(1 t)

+ 21 exp

 t
(1 t)2
 (32)
Cf (b) =
1
1  t  
 
t
1 t
2
4(b  1) + 22 exp

t
(1 t)2
 (33)
where
b =
(2  t)
4(1  t) ; b =
(2  t)
2(1  t) ;
1 =  2
24exp

 2t
(2 t)

(1  t)
35 < 0; 2 = 4
1
< 0; and
2 = 2b 

2  t
1  t

:
Note that as t ! 1, foreign rm expected prots go to zero. However, as can be seen
by the fact that b   b = (2 t)
4(1 t) , the bid space does not collapse. This is because the lowest
gross-of-tari cost foreign rm has a cost of zero. As a result, marking this up by 1
1 t still
results in a zero cost, meaning that such a rm is not driven from the bidding game for a
t  1.10 Given the continuity of the bid functions, foreign rms with a suciently small
cost but greater than zero will still bid as long as t < 1. In fact, unlike in the specic case
where cF ! 0 as we approached the prohibitive tari, for the ad valorem case, we have
cf ! 0:5 as we approach the prohibitive tari; we show this formally in the appendix. This
will have consequences when we analyze the home government's welfare at various tari
10When cd > 0, however, there again is a prohibitive tari since there will be a tari for which cd >
2cd cd
1 t ,
i.e. in which even the highest cost domestic rm wins with certainty.
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levels. Outside of this, however, the bid functions behave qualitatively similarly across the
the two regimes as illustrated in Figure 1. One dierence worth noting, however, is that the
gap between the domestic and foreign bids widens faster for the specic tari than the ad
valorem tari as the gross-of-tari cost rises. This is because the size of the burden created
by the ad valorem tari is proportional to the foreign rm cost whereas the specic tari
is not. As a result, the tari has less impact on low-cost foreign rms resulting in smaller
dierences in bidding behaviors.
3 The Government's Optimal Tari
In this section we analyze the government's optimal tari under the two tari policies; specic
and ad valorem. In both, the government sets the relevant tari to maximize expected
welfare, which is the sum of the value of the project, the expected payo conditional on
the domestic rm winning, and the expected payo conditional on the foreign rm winning.
In this, the government weights the domestic rm's prots by  2 [0; 1]. Such weighting is
comparable to McAfee and McMillan (1989). If  = 0, the prot of the domestic rm has
no eect on the government's payo and if  = 1, the domestic rm's prot fully enters the
government's payo (as it does in Branco (1994)).
3.1 Specic Tari
With a specic tari, conditional on a cost ~cd for the domestic rm, conditional expected
welfare is:
W (~cd; ) =
Z cf (bd(~cd))
cf
1
cf   cf
[V +    bf (cf )] dcf
+
Z cf
cf (bd(~cd))
1
cf   cf
[V   bd (~cd) +  (bd(~cd)  ~cd)] dcf (34)
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or, integrating across cf :
W (~cd; ) = V +
cf   cf (bd (~cd))
cf   cf
((   1) bd (~cd)  ~cd)
+

cf (bd(~cd))  cf
cf   cf

   1
cf   cf
Z cf (bd(~cd))
cf
bf (cf )dcf : (35)
To nd expected welfare, it is then necessary to integrate across ~cd, making expected welfare
as a function of the tari:
W () =
Z cd
cd
1
cd   cd
W (~cd; ) d~cd: (36)
In order to compare our results to Branco's (1994) for the equilibrium price premium,
from this point forward we assume that domestic costs are distributed on the unit interval.
This allows us to rewrite expected welfare as:
W () = V +
Z 1
0
"
[1 +    cf (bd (~cd))] [(   1) bd(~cd)  ~cd] + cf (bd(~cd)) 
  2  
Z cf (bd(~cd))

bf (cf )dcf
#
d ~cd: (37)
We can now state our next proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal specic tari is non-negative and strictly positive whenever  >
0, i.e. when domestic prots are positively valued. This optimal specic tari is increasing
in . In no case is the optimal specic tari prohibitive.
Proof. Taking the limit of the government's rst order condition as  ! 0 we see that:
lim
!0
dW
d
=
3
10
: (38)
Thus, the optimal tari is positive as long as the government puts a strictly positive value
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on domestic rm prots in its welfare function; i.e. if  > 0.11
Furthermore, when  = 0, in which case the bid functions are linear function of costs,
expected government welfare is V + 
6
  2
3
. When the tari is prohibitive, (i.e. when  = 2 in
the case of costs on the unit interval), expected government welfare is W (2) =
 
V + 3 4
2

.
Comparing the two, we see that:
W (0) W (2) = 4 (1  )
3
 0: (39)
This implies that free trade never does worse than autarky and has strictly higher expected
welfare whenever  < 1. Thus, combining these, when  = 0 a zero tari is optimal and that
when  > 0, the optimal tari is between zero and 2, i.e. between free trade and autarky.
To recognize that the optimal tari is increasing in , recognize that the weight on
domestic prots enters the welfare function's rst order condition only as  dE(d)
d
, that is, the
weighted impact on expected domestic prots. Because these are increasing in the tari for
each cost, so too are ex-ante expected domestic prots, meaning that a higher  increases this
positive element in the government's rst order condition, increasing the optimal tari.
This is illustrated using numerical analysis in Figure 2. Note that in this analysis,
we have only considered non-negative tari values to simplify discussion. If we were to
permit negative taris, however, in equilibrium they would never be used. To recognize
this, note that there is a discontinuity in the expected government welfare at a zero tari
which guarantees that only non-negative taris will be used. This is because when  < 0,
it is no longer the case that the domestic rm has a (weak) cost advantage. Therefore the
ranking of the two cost distributions reverse and the bid functions switch, i.e. the home
rm bids according to (19) and the foreign rm bids according to (18). After making that
adjustment, because the home government places no weight on the foreign rm's prots
(similar to a  = 0), it has no incentive to subsidize the foreign rm, particularly as this
11The full derivation of equation (38) is available upon request.
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Figure 2: Government Welfare
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comes with the cost of a negative subsidy. Therefore, for values of  below this cuto, the
optimal tari is a corner solution and equal to zero.
As an alternative to the government welfare above where foreign prots are not valued,
we could instead consider a social planner who seeks to maximize expected total surplus,
that is the (unweighted) sum of expected government surplus, expected domestic prots,
and expected foreign prots. It is straightforward to show that this is maximized by a zero
tari. This is because with a zero tari, rms use the same bidding function, ensuring that
the contract is awarded to the lowest cost rm. As the social planner is indierent between
surplus accruing to the government or either rm, minimizing the expected cost maximizes
expected total surplus.
Lemma 6. When  = 0 the equilibrium maximizes expected total surplus.
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3.2 Ad Valorem Tari
With an ad valorem tari, expected welfare is:
W (t) = V +
Z 1
0
"
[1  (1  t)Cf (bd (~cd))] [(   1) bd(~cd)  ~cd]
 (1  t)2
Z Cf (bd(~cd))
0
bf (Cf )dCf
#
d ~cd: (40)
As above, with free trade, expected welfare is
W (0) = V +
(   4)
6
:
Unfortunately, for t = 1, expected welfare is not analytically calculable since this tari is not
prohibitive for the reasons described in Section 2.1.3. We can nevertheless express it as:12
lim
t!1
W (t) = V +
Z 1
0
""
(   1) c 1d (~b)  ~cd
1 + c 1d (~b)
#
  lim
t!1
(
(1  t)2
Z Cf (bd(~cd))
0
bf (Cf )dCf
#
d ~cd
)
where
cd(~b) = 1  1
(1  ~b) exp

2~b
(1 ~b)
 :
Similarly to the specic tari case, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The optimal ad valorem tari is non-negative and strictly positive whenever
 > 0, i.e. when domestic prots are positively valued. This optimal ad valorem tari is
increasing in . In no case is the optimal ad valorem tari equal to unity.
Proof. Taking the limit of the government's rst order condition as t! 0 we see that:13
lim
t!0
dW
dt
=
11
60
> 0: (41)
12See appendix for the derivation of cd(~b).
13The full derivation of equation (41) is available upon request.
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Thus, the optimal ad valorem tari is positive for any positive . Using numerical analysis,
we nd that when  = 1, the optimal tari is approximately equal to 0:93353 < 1. Also,
recall (as shown in the appendix) that as t ! 1 the range of possible active foreign rms
approaches cf 2 [0; 0:5]. Further, numeric analysis indicates that the optimal ad valorem
tari is monotonic in , ranging from 0 when  = 0 to this level when  = 1. Thus, no
optimal ad valorem tari is such that the government attempts to capture the entire foreign
bid.
Using numerical methods, we plot the welfare function as the tari goes between 0 and
1 (free trade and prohibitive levels) in Figure 3. This illustrates the three features of the
above proposition. Finally, note that since the optimal ad valorem tari is zero when  = 0,
identical to Lemma 6 the equilibrium ad valorem tari maximizes total surplus in this special
case.
Figure 3: Government Welfare
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4 Relative Protectionism
A natural question is how the two tari regimes compare not only two each other, but also
to the price preference system. In particular, is there reason to be concern that eliminating
price preferences might lead governments to pursue second-best, less ecient methods of
protection? To do so, we compare the equilibrium under the equilibrium specic tari,
the equilibrium ad valorem tari, and the equilibrium price preference which is analyzed
by Branco (1994). In his alternative auction, the winning rm is paid its bid, however,
the winner need not be the lowest bid rm, since the domestic rm wins so long as the
dierence in bids does not exceed the price preference. In his paper, Branco derives, among
other things, the optimal price preference under a sealed-bid rst price auction when rm
prots are valued the same as government surplus and the costs of both the domestic and
foreign rm are distributed uniformly on the unit interval.14 As shown in his paper, at the
government's optimal price preference, equilibrium bids are:
bd(cd) =
3  c2d
2(2  cd) (42)
and
bf (cf ) = max

cf ;
1 + 2cf
4

(43)
with the domestic rm winning whenever
cD(bD)  cF (bF )
cF (bf )
< 1: (44)
To compare the three systems, we consider a measure of the level of protection as well
as equilibrium expected welfare. As a measure of protection, we use the expected foreign
rm prots. The higher this measure, the lower the level of ex-ante protection (i.e. ex-ante
14Among the other aspects of his model is that he allows for a deadweight loss to raising government
revenues, something we do not consider. Thus, to draw the comparisons between his results and ours, set
 = 0 in his notation and  = 1 in ours.
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to the determination of the foreign cost). Figure 4 provides this comparison by plotting the
conditional expected foreign prot, where it is conditional on its cost cf , across the three
policies as a function of the gross-of-tari foreign cost. Beginning with a low cost foreign
rm, we see that both taris result in lower prots than the price premium. This is because
a tari is a cost to the rm.15 Between the two taris, the specic tari is more protectionist
for these low cost foreigners than is the ad valorem tari. This is because the cost of the
ad valorem tari is proportional to the bid. Since bids are monotonic in costs, low cost
foreigners pay the least under the ad valorem tari, making this less burdensome to them
that the equilibrium \one size ts all" specic tari. As the foreign cost rises, the ranking
of the two taris reverses itself, precisely because the cost of the ad valorem tari rises in
the rm's cost whereas the cost of the specic tari does not. Further, for a range of foreign
costs around .5, the taris are less protectionist than the price premium. This range is
markedly larger for the specic tari (roughly gross-of-tari costs in the range (:47; :55))
for the reason just discussed. Finally, high cost foreign rms have no probability of winning
under any of the three equilibrium policies. Thus, conditional on the foreign cost, the ranking
of protectionism varies with that cost. In order to gauge ex-ante protectionism, we calculate
the unconditional expected foreign prot by integrating the probability weighted conditional
expected foreign prots over the range of foreign costs exclusive of the tari (i.e. [0; 1]).
Note that this accounts for the dierent levels of protectionism for dierent foreign costs.
The results of this are:
Table 1: Expected Foreign Prot Under Dierent Regimes
Specic Tari Ad Valorem Tari Price Premium Free Trade
0.043253236 0.042724554 0.072916667 0.166666667
As can be seen, all three policies are ex-ante more protectionist than free trade. Further,
both taris are ex-ante protectionist relative to the price premium, with the ad valorem
tari marginally more so. Although these results are driven by our assumptions, not the
15Recall that the ad valorem tari is on the bid which is positive even when the gross-of-tari cost, implying
a payment from the rm to the home government.
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least of which are those for the cost distributions, it does suggest that the recent shift in
the approach towards foreign rms bidding for government contracts can be a step towards
protectionism.
Figure 4: Expected Foreign Prot
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Although it is tempting to equilibrate this increase in protectionism under taris with
higher expected domestic welfare, it must be remembered that the bids tendered by foreigners
dier across the three regimes and therefore so too does expected welfare. Calculating this
numerically results in equilibrium expected welfare values of (where again,  = 1):
Table 2: Expected Welfare Under Dierent Regimes
Specic Tari Ad Valorem Tari Price Premium Free Trade
Optimal Tari 0.62410 0.93353 { {
Domestic Welfare 1.5814149 1.5821041 1.5833333 1.5
Global Welfare 1.6246682 1.6248286 1.6562500 1.6666667
From this, three things are seen. First, consistent with the above analytic results, domes-
tic welfare is lowest with free trade whereas global welfare (the sum of domestic expected
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welfare and expected foreign prots) is highest with free trade. Second, the price premium
is preferable to either tari, whether considered at the domestic level where the policy is
chosen or at the global level. This indicates that both taris are less desirable to the home
government than the optimal price preference. This is due to the fact that, although tari
revenue is collected, foreign rms attempt to pass through a part of the tari resulting in
higher equilibrium bids and lowering expected welfare. Furthermore, since average foreign
expected prots are lower under the two tari regimes, this means that global welfare is
also lower under the taris than under the price preference. As a result, it lends some
credence to the concern that the Government Procurement Agreement may have shifted
policy towards second-best methods of protection. Third, despite the fact that ad valorem
taris are marginally more protectionist than specic taris, both domestic and global wel-
fare are marginally greater for ad valorem taris. This is because ad valorem taris are
less protectionist against low-cost foreigners, a feature which enhances expected eciency in
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to consider the role of trade barriers such as taris,
on competition for government contracts. Comparable to the prior regime in which price
preferences are used, taris act as a barrier for foreign rms and inhibit their ability to
successfully bid for contracts. Further, similar to the results of McAfee and McMillan (1989)
and Branco (1994), the domestic government will choose erect a barrier against foreign rms
when domestic rm prots are positively valued. Despite this, however, these policies are
not identical. In particular, we show that protectionism under either a specic or an ad
valorem tari is greater than that under the price preference. This results in a decline in
both expected domestic welfare and expected total surplus. Therefore moving from the
previous regime with price preferences need not result in the desired goal of an equal playing
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eld for all rms; in fact, it can represent a step in the opposite direction.
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A Appendix
In this appendix we investigate the inverse bid functions under an ad valorem tari, as t! 1.
First, we look at the foreign rm. Recall that
cf (b) = (1  t)Cf (b) = 1  t
2
(1  t)
h
4(b  1) + 22 exp

t
(1 t)2
i (A-1)
When taking the limit as t ! 1, the diculty is that the bid space becomes unbounded.
Thus, we transform b into a monotonic function of ~b where ~b 2 [0; 1]. Let
b = b+

b  b~b = (2  t)
4(1  t)(1 +
~b):
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After this transformation, we can rewrite our foreign inverse bid function as
cf (~b) = 1  t
2h
(2  t)(1 + ~b)  4(1  t)  (2  t)(1  t)(~b  1) exp

 2t~b
(2 t)(1 ~b)
i : (A-2)
Now taking the limit, we have
lim
t!1
cf (~b) =
"
~b
(1 + ~b)
#
2

0;
1
2

: (A-3)
Now looking at the domestic rm, using the same transformation to the bid:
cd(~b) = 1  t
2
(2  t)
h
(1  t)

(1 + ~b)  4
(2 t)

  (~b  1) exp

2t~b
(2 t)(1 ~b)
i (A-4)
Now taking the limit, we get
lim
t!1
cd(~b) = 1  1
(1  ~b) exp

2~b
(1 ~b)
 : (A-5)
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